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INTRODUCTION 
On September 9, 2003, Tani Downing, Petitioner Lorin Blauer's supervisor - in 
retaliation for Mr. Blauer's successful challenge to her "unsuccessful" job rating -
"reassigned" Mr. Blauer to hold administrative hearings full time. He was the only 
Legal/Enforcement Counsel III employed by the State of Utah to be so singled out. 
Ms. Downing openly and admittedly based Mr. Blauer's "reassignment" on job 
performance issues and alleged failures - effectively a disciplinary / corrective action -
which, to this day, Mr. Blauer contends, and is willing and able to prove, are completely 
groundless. Moreover, the "reassignment" was to tasks which, as Ms. Downing well 
knew, Mr. Blauer could not perform by reason of disability. Any attempt to perform this 
particular set of duties would exacerbate his disabilities to the point of making him 
incapable of working at all. Ms. Downing effectively ended his career. 
Since September 9, 2003, Mr. Blauer has attempted to obtain a hearing on 
Ms. Downing's accusations and actions. He appealed the "reassignment" to Department 
of Workforce Services (DWS) Executive Director Raylene Ireland, who concluded that 
Mr. Blauer had no grounds to challenge the "reassignment" - even though it was clearly a 
disciplinary action based on unsubstantiated allegations of performance deficiencies, and 
entailed job duties which he was physically and psychologically unable to perform (R. 27-
149 at Attachment 26). Mr. Blauer then appealed to the State Career Service Review 
Board (CSRB), only to be told that it declined jurisdiction over his claims (R. 20-26). 
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Mr. Blauer petitioned for reconsideration of this decision (R. 27-149); CSRB declined to 
reconsider. Mr. Blauer then filed the 2004 action before the Third Judicial District Court 
(Civil No. 040900221; still pending), challenging his "reassignment" on various grounds, 
including demotion and rule violations. At the same time, he filed a complaint before the 
Anti-Discrimination & Labor Division of the Utah State Industrial Commission, 
challenging his "reassignment" on the additional basis of the ADA and the UADA. In 
motion practice before the court in the 2004 action, Judge Leslie Lewis determined that 
Mr. Blauer had not been "demoted" by his "reassignment"; she found, however, that 
CSRB had improperly declined jurisdiction of Mr. Blauer's remaining claims - including 
rule violations specifically invoking standards established by the ADA - and remanded 
them to the CSRB. 
This Court affirmed the trial court's ruling on appeal, yet CSRB took no action on 
the remanded issues for many months. During the interim, Mr. Blauer sought judicial 
review of DWS' actions under ADA and UADA before the Third District Court - only to 
be told that the Americans With Disabilities Act did not apply to Utah State employees 
(even though he had been repeatedly advised to invoke ADA remedies, and even though 
DWS employed an ADA coordinator to which Mr. Blauer was repeatedly referred 
without success - R. 27-149 at Attachment 24)1. At this juncture, CSRB again ruled that 
^ W S perpetuates this conundrum even now by insisting that employees file a 
complaint with UALD if their complaint involves ADA issues. 
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it had no jurisdiction over Mr. Blauer's remaining claims expressly remanded by Third 
District Court for determination (R. 659-670); this time, however, CSRB labeled its 
decision as the product of a "formal adjudicative proceeding", thus attempting to deprive 
the Third Judicial District Court of jurisdiction to enforce its own order of remand in the 
2004 action, and directing any petition for relief to this Court under Utah Code Ann. § 63-
46b-16. 
Through all of this, DWS demonstrates a consistent, divide-and-concur strategy: 
breaking the case into as many pieces as possible, eliminating Mr. Blauer's attempts to 
obtain a hearing on the merits by invoking a series of procedural tripwires; stretching 
favorable rulings over as much ground as possible; and side-stepping the jurisdiction of 
the Third District Court where rulings are not favorable. Before delving into the merits 
of DWS' arguments in this appeal, it bears noting that DWS' procedural gyrations in this 
entire matter have utterly subverted the clear legislative policy and purpose underlying the 
grievance procedures set out at Utah Code Ann. § 67-19a-101, et seq.\ the simple, 
prompt resolution of public employee grievances on their merits. As punishment for 
having challenged the validity of his supervisor's unlawful acts, Lorin Blauer has been 
plunged into a four-year procedural quagmire, and has yet to be heard by a court of 
competent jurisdiction on the merits of his claims. It is difficult to imagine that the Utah 
legislature intended to equip the State's Department of Workforce Services with tools to 
construct the procedural bramble bush demonstrated in this action, as a vehicle for 
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defending its supervisors from having to answer for the consequences of their illegal 
actions. 
DWS' opposing brief in this appeal essentially raises two defenses: (1) CSRB's 
December 6, 2006, decision dismissing the claims remanded to it by the Third District 
Court in the 2004 action was the result of a "formal adjudicative proceeding" because 
CSRB decided to label it as such; and (2) CSRB properly dismissed the remanded claims 
because they were not fully articulated in Mr. Blauer's initial appeal of his "reassign-
ment", but only in his Request for Reconsideration of its initial ruling. Neither claim has 
any merit. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I. CSRB'S DECEMBER 6, 2006, RULING WAS NOT THE 
RESULT OF A "FORMAL ADJUDICATIVE PRO-
CEEDING" 
A. Proceedings Before CSRB Did Not Qualify as "Formal Adjudicative 
Proceedings" as Defined by Statute. 
DWS first maintains that the December 6, 2006, ruling from CSRB, which 
disregarded the Third District Court's Order of Remand and concluded, once again, that 
CSRB lacked jurisdiction to hear Mr. Blauer's claims of rule violation, etc., was a 
"formal adjudicative proceeding" because CSRB so designated it (Opposing Brief at 
p. 14-21). Even DWS acknowledges, however, that the enabling statute in this regard 
does not enable CSRB - or any other administrative agency - to constitute a proceeding 
"formal" or "informal" simply by appropriate labeling. Rather, the legislature has granted 
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to administrative agencies the authority to determine whether certain types of proceedings 
will be conducted as informal or formal adjudicative proceedings - but in accordance 
with statutory requirements: 
The agency may, by rule, designate categories of adjudicative proceedings 
to be conducted informally according to the procedures set forth in rules 
enacted under the authority of this chapter if; 
(a) the use of the informal procedures does not violate any 
procedural requirement imposed by a statute other than this chapter; 
(b) in the view of the agency, the rights of the parties to the 
proceedings will be reasonably protected by the informal procedures; 
(c) in the view of the agency, the agency's administrative 
efficiency will be enhanced by categorizations; and 
(d) the cost of formal adjudicative proceedings outweighs the 
potential benefits to the public of a formal adjudicative proceeding. 
Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b-4(l); emphasis added. Section 63-46b-4 then goes on to 
provide (in relevant part) that "all agency adjudicative proceedings not specifically 
designated as informal proceedings by the agency's rules shall be conducted formally in 
accordance with the requirements of this chapter" - Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b-4(2); 
emphasis added. As noted at pages 27-29 of Petitioner's Opening Brief, CSRJB's 
designation of its proceedings as "formal" controls nothing if the requirements of the 
Administrative Procedures Act are not met. Petitioner has already cited this Court to the 
case of Lopez v. Career Service Review Bd., 834 P.2d 568 (Utah App. 1992) for the 
proposition that, to be construed (and reviewable) as a "formal adjudicative proceeding", 
808326vl 5 
a proceeding before an administrative agency must meet the requirements of the 
Administrative Procedures Act. 
Concerning DWS' accusation that Mr. Blauer "grossly misrepresents" proceedings 
before CSRB upon remand in the 2004 action (Opposing Brief at p. 16), the Court is 
referred to the record before it. The hearing officer prefaced her decision by observing 
that "no witnesses appeared and no other evidence was received into the record other than 
that which is already on file". (Opening Brief at Addendum 1, p. 1). Petitioner, then, was 
given no opportunity to "present evidence, argue, respond, conduct cross-examination, 
and submit rebuttal evidence" - Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b-8(d). Unlike the Lopez 
decision, CSRB's hearing in this matter did not permit the Petitioner to present evidence, 
did not involve any stipulation by Petitioner that a written record would constitute 
evidence in the matter - and in no way reached the merits of the claims expressly 
remanded by the Third District Court in the 2004 action for resolution. It was a 
jurisdictional rejection, precisely like the prior order reversed in the 2004 action. 
B. The Doctrine of Issue Preclusion Does Not Deprive This Court of 
Jurisdiction to Determine the Character of the CSRB 
Proceeding. 
DWS' next argument concerning the formal vs. informal character of the CSRB 
proceeding is unique. Without citing a single Utah case, DWS argues that the doctrine of 
"issue preclusion" bars this Court from determining whether proceedings before the 
CSRB were formal or informal, because a separate judge of the Third District Court has 
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already made the decision for it. The argument, however, betrays a misunderstanding of 
the nature of issue preclusion, as well as the nature of the proceeding before this Court. 
Petitioner acknowledges that, at the same time he filed this petition, he also filed 
an independent action before the Third Judicial District Court (Case No. 070900108) 
seeking review of CSRB's December 6, 2006, ruling herein as the product of an 
"informal adjudicative proceeding"; further, that by Order dated April 9, 2007, 
Judge Joseph Fratto dismissed that 2007 action, concluding that CSRB's proceeding had 
been a "formal adjudicative proceeding", and that the trial court therefore lacked subject 
matter jurisdiction2. On the same day that the 2007 action was filed before Third District 
Court, however, this Petition was filed, seeking this Court's original review of CSRB's 
action, and challenging CSRB's characterization of the proceeding as a "formal 
adjudicative proceeding". In short, the 2007 filing before the Third District Court, and 
this proceeding, were both appeals simultaneously taken from the same ruling, seeking 
alternate remedies depending upon whether CSRB's ruling was or was not the result of a 
"formal adjudicative proceeding". 
By DWS' own admission, a dismissal for lack of jurisdiction does not operate as a 
final adjudication on the merits of a claim (Opposing Brief at p. 13). This principle has 
been repeatedly emphasized in recent litigation - see Remy v. Gonzales, 2007 WL 
2As noted in Petitioner's opening brief, the 2007 action was necessitated by the 30-
day appeal period under the APA, given that the Third District Court had not yet ruled 
(and still has not yet ruled) on his Motion to Reconsider Order of Remand therein. 
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2376777 (5th Cir. 2007); 8 Arlington Street, LLC v. Arlington Land Acquisition - 99, LLC, 
2007 WL 2367753 (Mass. Super. 2007); John v. U.S., 2007 WL 2255149 (Fed. CI. 2007). 
Under Utah law, issue preclusion only applies where "the first suit resulted in a final 
judgment on the merits" - State v. Paolone, 2007 Utah App. 285, 2007 WL 2446485 
(emphasis added). On this basis alone, "issue preclusion" may not deprive this Court of 
the right to determine whether CSRB's decision was or was not the result of a "formal 
adjudicative proceeding". 
DWS' argument suffers a more fundamental failing, however. The doctrine of 
"issue preclusion" was intended to bar re-litigation of identical issues in successive 
proceedings before courts of similar jurisdiction. This is also implied in the decision of 
State v. Paolone, cited supra, which states that "issue preclusion, or collateral estoppel, 
'prevents parties or privies from re-litigating facts and issues in the second suit that were 
fully litigated in the first suit" - 2007 Utah App. at 285 (emphasis added). For decisions 
that are rendered by different courts as part of the same, ongoing proceeding, rules of 
preclusion do not apply. This was made clear by the U.S. Supreme Court in the case of 
Arizona v. California, 530 U.S. 392, 120 S. Ct. 2304, 147 L. Ed. 2d 374 (2000). In that 
action, the state of Arizona invoked the U.S. Supreme Court's original jurisdiction to 
settle the dispute with California over the states' respective rights to use water from the 
Colorado River system. The United States intervened, seeking to shelter water rights for 
five Native American reservations. The Supreme Court issued its initial decision in the 
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mid-1950s. Several decades later, two of the tribes involved in the prior Supreme Court 
decision sought to contest water rights issues included within the Supreme Court's prior 
determination. Despite the passage of time, the Supreme Court held the matter to 
constitute "a single ongoing original action", in which "the technical rules of preclusion 
are not strictly applicable" - 530 U.S. at 392. 
This Petition was filed in tandem with the 2007 action before the Third District 
Court, both with the same purpose: to challenge CSRB's rejection of the Third District 
Court's directive, in the 2004 action (which has not been reduced to final judgment, and 
remains pending) that it lacked jurisdiction over claims remanded in the 2004 action. It 
was CSRB's December 6, 2006, decision which was the subject of both appeals. As 
such, both appeals are part of a single, ongoing action challenging CSRB's ruling. The 
purpose of "issue preclusion", which is avoidance of serial re-litigation of specific issues, 
would not be served in such a situation. 
At all events, the relief which Petitioner seeks through this action leads to the same 
place regardless of the characterization of CSRB's administrative proceeding: remand to 
Third District Court for a proper adjudication on the merits of the claims remanded by the 
Third District Court to CSRB in the 2004 action. 
POINT II. PETITIONER'S REMANDED CLAIMS FROM THE 
2004 ACTION WERE PROPERLY BEFORE CSRB. 
DWS' remaining argument is that - Judge Lewis' ruling in the 2004 action 
notwithstanding - the remanded claims were not properly before it, having not been 
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raised in Mr. Blauer's initial petition to CSRB with the same detail that they were set out 
in his request for reconsideration. See Opposing Brief at pp. 21-27. DWS refers 
repeatedly to these as "new" claims, which they clearly were not - though they were not 
set forth in the initial appeal with the same detail that they were set out in the Request for 
Reconsideration, they were nevertheless identified and preserved. Apparently, DWS 
wishes this Court to construe the grievance and appeal procedure set out at Utah Code 
Ann. § 67- 19a-101 et seq. with such precision that, if at any stage of the proceeding, the 
grievant fails to lay out with complete particularity each and every argument supporting 
each and every grievance, any claim not so preserved "up the chain" is lost forever, 
having been "waived". DWS' argument ignores the nature of the grievance process, the 
express preservation of the right to request reconsideration, and Judge Lewis' express 
order in the 2004 action, from which no appeal has been taken. 
On its face, the grievance and appeal procedure set out by the Utah legislature for 
Career Service Employees within the state of Utah is quick and informal. While it 
permits either self-representation or "assistance by a representative of the employee's 
choice to act as an advocate at any level of the grievance procedure" (Utah Code Ann. 
§ 67-19a-303(l)(a)), representation by trained legal counsel (with accompanying 
precision in pleading and arguing complex claims and theories) is clearly not 
contemplated. The first step is completely verbal; if it fails to resolve the issue, a written 
grievance must be submitted - within five days. It is followed by a written grievance to 
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the agency or division director, which must be submitted within ten days of the 
supervisor's decision - Utah Code Ann. § 67-19a-402(2). The appeal to CSRB must take 
place within ten days after resolution of the prior appeal at the agency or division level -
Utah Code Ann. § 67-19a-402(5). 
Given the informal, fast-track nature of the foregoing procedure, it is ironic that 
DWS now argues that each step of the procedure must be accompanied by a full "bill of 
particulars", laying out every detail of the grievant's concerns. To impose such a standard 
would be to place a greater burden of pleading on a public employee than is incumbent on 
members of the bar under Rule 8, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. 
The informal and emerging nature of Mr. Blauer's grievance, moreover, was 
clearly understood by his superiors during the grievance process preceding Mr. Blauer's 
appeal to CSRB. As noted in DWS Director Raylene Ireland's letter of October 14, 2003 
(R. 27-149 at Attachment 26), concerns relating to Mr. Blauer's grievance were largely 
presented orally and informally (both during and after a meeting held on September 26, 
2003). While Mr. Blauer and his non-lawyer representative, Tom Cantrell, followed the 
written grievance procedure mandated by the Act (see Agency's Response in Opposition 
to Grievant's Request for Reconsideration, R. 153-275 at Exhibits 4-6), the written record 
prior to Mr. Blauer's Request for Reconsideration is not long on particulars. 
Nevertheless, Mr. Blauer's appeal to CSRB (R. 13-17) was neither vague nor inadequate. 
It included the following claims specified in writing by his representative: 
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Lorin's "reassignment" is an unjustified demotion for unsupportable cause. 
It violates rules, statutes, and prevailing case law governing discipline, 
demotion, dismissal, performance appraisal, the grievance and appeals 
procedures, discrimination, harassment, retaliation, etc. It is an ill-disguised 
act of discipline without cause. It is punitive, discriminatory, and 
retaliatory. . . . It intentionally or callously places a seasoned and successful 
Career Service Employee in harms way by forcing him into a situation 
which exacerbates known medical conditions creating diagnosable pain and 
suffering. It is contrary to his doctor's express advice to the Department. It 
is physically and emotionally abusive. 
Petitioner, then, did not simply claim that the "reassignment" was "an unjustified 
demotion for unsupportable cause". He also claimed that it "violated rules [and] law 
governing discipline, demotion, dismissal, performance appraisal, the grievance and 
appeals procedures, discrimination, harassment, [and] retaliation..." Petitioner's 
representative further established the foundational claim that the reassignment was an 
"act of discipline" and that it was "punitive, discriminatory, and retaliatory." 
The Request for Reconsideration, though more detailed and formal, was nevertheless 
firmly footed on the initial allegations set forth by the Petitioner's non-attorney 
representative. No claim was "new". 
It was when Mr. Blauer's October 24, 2003, appeal to CSRB was rejected on 
jurisdictional grounds that he elected to invoke reconsideration procedures provided by 
the Utah Administrative Procedures Act. It is instructional to contrast the APA's 
language concerning requests for reconsideration with the fast-track, relatively informal 
procedure outlined in the grievance and appeals procedure for career service employees: 
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Within 20 days after the date that an order is issued for which review by the 
agency or by a superior agency under § 63-46b-12 is unavailable, and if the 
order would otherwise constitute final agency action, any party may file a 
written request for reconsideration with the agency, stating the specific 
grounds upon which relief is requested, 
Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b-13(l)(a). By definition, a "request for reconsideration" is 
addressed to the same court or adjudicative body issuing an initial decision. Union Oil 
Co. of California v. State Dept. of Natural Resources, 526 P.2d 1357 (Alaska 1974); 
Kerr-McGee Nuclear Corp. v. New Mexico Environmental Improvement Bd., 97 N.M. 88, 
637 P.2d 38 (1981). Simple logic dictates that a request for reconsideration must address, 
clarify or amplify specifics not considered by the adjudicative body as part of its initial 
decision; otherwise, a request for reconsideration would be an exercise in futility. The 
Administrative Procedures Act recognizes the purpose of such a request, calling upon the 
grievant to set forth specifics in support of the request. 
Petitioner recognizes that his Request for Reconsideration (R. 27-149), contained 
more detail than did the written submittals to his superiors within DWS, and to CSRB, 
that preceded it. That was its purpose, as contemplated by the Administrative Procedures 
Act - to set forth Petitioner's claims with more specifics, and ask CSRB to take a fresh 
look at its decision. But it did not invent new claims. That such specifics were not 
contained in prior written submittals cannot meaningfully be construed as a "waiver" of 
808326vl 13 
those claims, given the broad and informal nature of the grievance procedure which went 
before, and its fast-track processing.3 
Judge Leslie Lewis was clearly in accord. In her Memorandum Decision of 
August 16, 2004 in the 2004 Action (R. 576-581), Judge Lewis did not consider the 
allegations as "new" claims or unrelated to the original complaint. She, in fact, dismissed 
out of hand the very argument urged by DWS here, concluding that "the Court. . . does 
not find the Motion to Dismiss to be well-taken . . . Overall, the Court is satisfied that it 
has the jurisdiction to consider this matter and that the plaintiff has exhausted his 
available administrative remedies." R. 576-581 at pp. 1-2. Consider further that, even 
while CSRB was considering DWS' Motion to Dismiss the remanded claims, Petitioner 
was pursuing a Motion to Reconsider the Order of Remand, on which the trial court has 
yet to rule in the 2004 Action; upon seeing DWS' motion, however, Judge Lewis clearly 
expressed surprise at the disrespect with which her remand order was being met. It is 
interesting that DWS, so vociferous on the preclusive effect of prior declarations by the 
Third District Court, fails even to mention that court's disposition of its argument in this 
regard. 
3
 By definition, a "waiver" is an intentional and voluntary relinquishment of a 
known right - see US Realty 86 Associates v. Security Investment, Ltd., 2002 UT 14, 40 
P. 3d 586. This Court should therefore narrowly construe any implied waiver by failure 
to itemize particulars at every stage of the grievance procedure. 
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CONCLUSION 
In contrast to the procedural morass into which this proceeding has metastasized, 
Petitioner Lorin Blauer seeks a simple and straight-forward remedy: a hearing on the 
merits of the claims remanded by the district court in the 2004 action on their merits, 
whether before the Third District Court or before the CSRB. Given that remaining issues 
are still pending before the Third District Court in the 2004 action, considerations of 
judicial economy dictate a remand to Third District Court for consolidation into the 2004 
action, such that all issues may be decided in one proceeding. 
DATED this 7th day of September, 2007. 
JONES WALDO HOLBROOK & McDONOUGH PC 
Vincent C. Rampton 
Attorneys for Petitioner 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
The undersigned hereby certifies that a true and correct copy of the foregoing was 
mailed via first class mail, postage prepaid, to the following this 7th day of September, 
2007: 
J. Clifford Petersen 
Assistant Utah Attorney General 
Mark L. Shurtleff, Utah Attorney General 
160 East 300 South, Sixth Floor 
P.O. Box 140856 
Salt Lake City, UT 84114-0856 
Kevin C. Timpkin 
Acting Chairman 
Career Service Review Board J 
State Office Building, Room 1120 // 
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